Damages - Personal injury - Sexual Assault - Dismissal of proceedings - Inordinate delay - Risk of fair trial - death of witnesses 

Facts: Following the institution of proceedings by the plaintiff seeking an order for damages arising out of personal injury caused to the plaintiff by the first named defendant in the form of infliction of sexual assault over time, the first named defendant had now filed the present application, being supported by the other defendants seeking an order for the dismissal of the plaintiff’s proceedings on the basis of inexcusable delay. The defendants asserted that since the alleged incidents had occurred 52 years ago, it was not possible to have fair trial of the issues between the parties. The second named defendant being the representative of the body responsible for the management of the school wherein the alleged incidents of sexual assault of the plaintiff took place had contended that since there were no documents pertaining to the relevant years, the trial against her would be highly prejudicial. The defendants also argued that since the plaintiff’s witnesses being his mother and cousin were dead, it would not be possible to corroborate the conduct and effect of the alleged incident on the plaintiff, the fact which had significant bearing in relation to the present proceedings. The third named defendant being the bishop for the concerned diocese asserted that he had no documentation establishing the relationship between the first named defendant and the diocese and that the persons involved with the first named defendant were now deceased. 
Held: Ms. Justice Baker granted an order for the dismissal of proceedings against the second and third named defendants while refusing to dismiss the proceedings against the first named defendant. The Court found that since the second and third named defendants had failed to provide any concrete documentation concerning the education records of the plaintiff during the relevant years, despite their best efforts, it would be against justice to allow the trial to proceed against them. The Court observed that though there had been inordinate delay in initiating the present proceedings, an order for dismissal would not be warranted as the plaintiff had adequately explained the reason for delay namely, making extensive inquiries, collection of evidence, psychiatric treatment and threats by the first named defendant. The Court, in conformity with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Primor v Stokes Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 I.R. 459, held that the conduct of the parties and fairness should be seen while deciding whether to grant an order for dismissal. The Court held that in the absence of any oral evidence by the first named defendant, it was not possible for the Court to deal with the issue of time-limit raised by the first named defendant under s. 2 of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 2000. 
Keating, Henry v Riordan, Tom and ors